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The Future of Empirical Legal 




For some time now, scholarly journals have been editing and publishing 
empirical legal studies. This includes both peer-reviewed journals, in fi elds 
such as law, economics, and psychology, and non-peer-reviewed, student-
edited law journals. The number of empirical legal studies that show up in 
the pages of journals has been on the rise as empirical methods improve and 
researchers gain easy access to a growing number of data sets. This addition 
to legal scholarship is welcome after decades of theory’s dominance. Prior to 
the entrance of empirical work onto the scene, we were drowning in a sea 
of predictions derived from unvalidated theories. Journals were fi lled with 
guesses, and we blindly applied theory in policymaking, if at all, in the absence 
of evidence that the relevant theoretical insights were accurate and robust. The 
situation has improved in recent years as we have sought to verify theories 
relevant to law and policy using data from a rapidly expanding number of 
sources.
This is the good news. The troubling news is that empirical scholarship in 
most fi elds is under fi re. Several studies published during the past decade have 
revealed the tenuous nature of a shockingly high percentage of some of the 
most widely cited empirical results. Empiricists are scrambling to fi nd eff ective 
ways to restore confi dence in published empirical studies. The situation in 
the fi eld of law is doubly worse. First, the average quality of empirical 
studies published in student-edited law reviews is undoubtedly lower than 
those published in peer-reviewed journals. This is partly because law review 
editorial boards, usually comprising solely law students, do not systematically 
require expert review of submitted work. Student editors are eager to publish 
empirical work, but too often lack the expertise to ensure that they publish 
only high-quality, replicable studies. This system encourages submissions by 
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authors who are interested in testing theory but lack suffi  cient expertise in 
empirical methods. As a result, empirical studies published in law reviews 
are often plagued by basic problems such as incorrect defi nitions of technical 
terms, application of incorrect tests, and misinterpretations of results. Second, 
although many experts have identifi ed problems with studies published by 
law reviews, little is being done to remedy them. 
This failure to improve is not for lack of ideas. Several methods experts 
have cataloged the problems and off ered numerous suggestions for turning 
things around. Some have attempted to clarify the rules of inference via article-
length tutorials. Others have suggested that student editors be required to 
take courses in empirical methods taught by experts, that experts be added to 
law review editorial boards, that nonexperts interested in producing empirical 
work either enroll in short methods courses or fi nd methodologists willing to 
co-author, and that law journals design and implement data- and procedure-
disclosure policies to facilitate easier replication of published studies. The list 
goes on. Only one of the ideas has taken hold. A number of universities off er 
short methods courses designed for law professors interested in producing 
empirical legal studies. While these courses certainly hold promise, they might 
unintentionally worsen the situation. The law professors gain knowledge 
suffi  cient to use fancy statistical software to employ technical empirical models 
to produce estimates that get neatly organized into impressive looking tables, 
but at least some of the short courses provide insuffi  cient training to ensure 
that the professors can employ the methods at a level that would satisfy expert 
peer reviewers.
This essay argues that most ideas for improving law review editorial 
practices have failed because they do not capitalize on the interests of inexpert 
authors and student editors. To increase the chance of improving quality, the 
infrastructure of the publication system must be altered to generate incentives 
for authors to produce high-quality work, and some combination of carrots 
and sticks must be eff ectively employed to encourage student editors to ensure 
high-quality publications. Both authors and students have incentives to 
protect their reputations. Authors who submit empirical studies to law reviews 
might take steps to increase the quality of their work if critical reviews of it 
were posted publicly. Student editors might do more to ensure publication 
of only high-quality empirical studies if journals were publicly graded on the 
quality of published studies and their policies related to pre-publication peer 
review and data availability. The purpose of this essay is to argue that change 
will occur only if those with the power to eff ect change have suffi  ciently strong 
incentives to improve.
Who would expend the eff ort to take such steps? The proposal in the 
following pages relies on an assumption that a suffi  cient number of methods 
experts will pitch in to do the work required to generate strong incentives 
for change. These experts do a far bit now to promote high-quality empirical 
legal scholarship. Experts expend eff ort, for example, as directors and 
members of the Society for Empirical Legal Studies, an academic association 
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designed to encourage empirical work on legal issues, to stimulate interaction 
among scholars in law and other academic fi elds and to organize an annual 
conference on empirical legal studies.1 This essay proposes the addition of a 
fourth mission: to join the eff orts of empiricists in other fi elds who are working 
to reinvigorate confi dence in published empirical work.
The essay is organized as follows. I fi rst make the easy argument for the 
value of empirical legal studies. I then describe the ongoing quality crisis, 
not only in the law review literature but also in empirical literature across 
virtually all fi elds. I argue that the legal academy should join in the eff orts 
in other disciplines to bolster confi dence in published empirical work. The 
legal academy should, at the same time, take steps to remedy much more basic 
problems that tend not to plague peer-reviewed empirical scholarship, such 
as the use of objectively incorrect statistical tests and empirical specifi cations 
and the drawing of invalid inferences from empirical results. After laying out 
a set of possible causes of these basic problems, the essay off ers a number of 
proposed solutions designed to capitalize on the interests of inexpert authors 
and inexpert editors. The solutions call for instituting incentives for authors 
and editors to increase the quality of published empirical work. I suggest that 
existing academic societies already engaged in building infrastructures to 
foster empirical work are best-suited to institute such incentives.
Value of Empirical Legal Scholarship
Few doubt the value of empirical legal scholarship.2 It contributes both 
to the development of “a mature legal science,”3 which aids in our endeavor 
to accurately describe and explain what we observe, and to informed 
policymaking. In both the sciences and social sciences, valid empirical data 
analysis is essential to verifying predictions based on theories and thus to 
developing confi dence in the theories themselves. Researchers verify by 
deriving precise hypotheses from the theory under investigation, collecting 
data—from the fi eld or from the laboratory, for example—and analyzing the 
1. THE SOCIETY FOR EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES, HTTP://WWW.LAWSCHOOL.CORNELL.EDU/SELS/
ABOUT.CFM (last visited July 30, 2016). 
2. See generally Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807 (1999); 
Michael Heise, The Past, Present, and Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: Judicial Decision Making 
and the New Empiricism, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 819 [hereinafter Heise, Judicial Decision Making] 
(comprising just one paper of a number of papers in a symposium issue dedicated to 
arguing for the benefi ts of empirical legal scholarship and encouraging its production). I 
adopt Michael Heise’s defi nition of “empirical legal scholarship” as “the subset of empirical 
legal scholarship that uses statistical techniques and analyses. By statistical techniques and 
analyses I mean studies that employ data . . . that facilitate descriptions of or inferences to a 
larger sample or population as well as replication by other scholars.” Heise, Judicial Decision 
Making, supra, at 821.
3. Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work, and the Scientifi c Method in the 
Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 900 (2002) (“[E]mpirical work is an absolutely vital 
part of the development of a mature legal science.”).
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data to confi rm or disprove the hypotheses. Empirical verifi cation is critical in 
our endeavor to develop models with strong predictive value. 
The stronger a theory’s predictive value, the more confi dently we can apply 
the theory in prospective policymaking. Empirical validation helps us move 
from a conversation in the pages of academic literature to the application 
of science in the form of evidence-based policy. Theory is useful. Theory 
backed by a single, methodologically sound empirical study is better. We get 
closer to the ideal, however, when the theory we wish to apply is supported 
by a collection of methodologically sound empirical studies from a variety 
of contexts using a number of diff erent methods and diff erent data samples 
drawn from relevant populations. While robust empirical verifi cation cannot 
guarantee that some adopted policy will work as intended, it can help guide us 
toward policies with the best chance of fulfi lling their promise.
The usefulness of empirical legal research, however, depends heavily on the 
methods employed to produce it and on the validity of the inferences drawn 
from reported results. Its value diminishes if researchers fail to employ best 
practices and publishers of such studies do not maintain eff ective checks on 
the quality of published work.
Continuing Crisis of Low Quality
The quality of scholarship published in student-edited law reviews has been 
under attack for some time. 4 In more recent challenges, critics have railed 
against the poor quality of empirical legal studies published by the reviews. 5 
My ongoing conversations with colleagues suggest that many in the legal 
academy and beyond share this negative appraisal. Likely few would dispute 
the claim that the average quality of empirical work published in law reviews 
lies somewhere below that of work published in peer-reviewed journals.6
4. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, “The Most Remarkable Institution”: The American Law Review, 36 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 1 (1986); Richard A. Posner, The Future of the Student-Edited Law Review, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1131 (1995); Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1936-1937); Fred Rodell, 
Goodbye to Law Reviews—Revisited, 48 VA. L. REV. 279 (1962). Undoubtedly the legal academy 
continues to lament the low quality of all types of work published in student-edited law 
journals. The problems with quality certainly are not limited to empirical studies. The larger 
quality issues are beyond the scope of this narrow essay. The essay’s bottom line, that quality 
improvements require capitalizing on the interests of the actors with control over quality, can 
be generalized to other types of scholarship published in law reviews.
5. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss, When Do Facts Persuade? Some Thoughts on the Market for “Empirical 
Legal Studies,” 71 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (2008); Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of 
Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). See also Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, 
Above the Rules: A Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135, 149 (2002) (forwarding 
a milder critique than Epstein and King’s, but conceding that “[t]o be sure, the quality of 
scholarship (empirical and nonempirical, theoretical and doctrinal) that appears in student-
edited law reviews varies, sometimes tremendously.”).
6. But see Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response 
to Concerns (Cornell Law Faculty Publ’ns Paper 974, 2011), http://scholarship.law.cornell.
edu/facpub/974.
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To be sure, peer review is hardly a panacea when it comes to ensuring 
quality. 7 In fact, the social sciences academy is in the midst of its own quality 
crisis. 8 Recently methodologists have attempted to replicate results published 
in top social sciences journals with mixed success.9 Others have produced 
evidence that journals suff er from publication bias, the tendency of editors 
to publish statistically signifi cant results over null results.10 This bias leads to 
an imbalance in published studies in the sense that studies that fail to identify 
predicted eff ects are less likely to see the light of day relative to those that 
fi nd, perhaps just by chance, statistically signifi cant eff ects. Still others have 
been working on ways to detect tricks researchers use to produce statistically 
signifi cant results with the hopes of easing the road to publication.11 Such 
fi ndings suggest that the current peer-review system used by academic journals 
is insuffi  cient to ensure high quality.
The legal academy and researchers in the social sciences have reacted 
diff erently to these concerns. Social science researchers have taken steps to 
advance solutions and reestablish credibility. Following the fi restorm against 
psychology studies in 2012, Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman wrote an open 
letter to academic psychologists imploring them to “do something . . . and 
7. See Gregory Mitchell, Empirical Legal Scholarship as Scientifi c Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 175 
(2004) (reviewing critiques of peer review, off ering a defense of the system and ultimately 
suggesting that student-edited law journals “compel[] the disclosure of important 
information about empirical research using a common methodological language so that the 
research may be subjected to critical scrutiny.”).
8. See, e.g., John Ioannidis & Chris Doucouliagos, What’s to Know About the Credibility of Empirical 
Economics?, 27 J. ECON. SURVS. 997 (2013). Similar problems have been identifi ed in medical 
research and the hard sciences more generally. See, e.g., John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most Published 
Research Findings Are False, 2 PLOS MED. 0696 (2005). I focus here on the identifi ed problems 
and reactions to them in the social sciences. 
9. ANDREW C. CHANG & PHILLIP LI, Is Economics Research Replicable? Sixty Published Papers from 
Thirteen Journals Say “Usually Not”, FIN. & ECON. DISCUSSION SERIES 2015-083 (2015), https://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/fi les/2015083pap.pdf; Colin F. Camerer et 
al., Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics, 351 SCIENCE 1433 (2016); Stéphane 
Doyen et al., Behavioral Priming: It’s All in the Mind, but Whose Mind?, 7 PLOS ONE e29081 (2012); 
Stuart J. Ritchie et al., Failing the Future: Three Unsuccessful Attempts to Replicate Bem’s ‘Retroactive 
Facilitation of Recall’ Eff ect, 7 PLOS ONE e33423 (2012); Open Science Collaboration, Estimating 
the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 349 SCIENCE 943 (2015). A healthy battle over the 
soundness of the replication methodology has ensued. See, e.g., Christopher J. Anderson 
et al., Response to Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” 351 SCIENCE 1037 
(2016); Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Comment on “Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science,” 351 
SCIENCE 1037 (2016). 
10. See, e.g., Gregory Francis, Publication Bias and the Failure of Replication in Experimental Psychology, 19 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 975 (2012); John P.A. Ioannidis et al., The Power of Bias in Economics 
Research (Deakin Univ. Working Paper No. 1, 2016), https://www.deakin.edu.au/__data/
assets/pdf_fi le/0007/477763/2016_1.pdf. 
11. See, e.g., Joseph P. Simmons et al., False-Positive Psychology: Undisclosed Flexibility in Data Collection 
and Analysis Allows Presenting Anything as Signifi cant, 22 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1359 (2011). 
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. . . do it collectively.”12 In response, a set of thirty-six research groups from 
around the globe formed the Many Labs Replication Project.13 The goal of the 
project was to replicate thirteen eff ects reported in widely cited psychological 
studies.14 They published all data sets and procedures through the Open 
Science Framework.15 The Berkeley Initiative for Transparency in the Social 
Sciences was established in 2012 to “strengthen the quality of social science 
research and evidence used for policy-making.”16 A number of psychologists 
are now heading up projects to replicate fi ndings and promote disclosure of 
materials suffi  cient to perform such replications.17 Several private foundations 
recently donated $10 million to the Center for Open Science, founded in 2013 
and directed by members of the academy to “increase openness, integrity, and 
reproducibility of scientifi c research.”18 
The fi eld of political science has also taken steps toward increasing research 
transparency, including access to data. In 2010, the American Political Science 
Association (APSA) formed an ad hoc committee to formulate a plan.19 
The committee grew into an organization called Data Access & Research 
Transparency (DA-RT). Members of DA-RT drafted an ethics guide that 
was eventually adopted by APSA. In addition, a consortium of twenty-seven 
political science journal editors signed a joint statement to commit individually 
to implement a set of transparency policies by January 2016.20 Two scholars 
kicked off  the Political Science Replication Initiative to encourage and 
facilitate replication of empirical studies in political science.21
A similar movement is occurring in economics, but progress seems slower. 
A growing (but still small) number of economics journals have instituted 
data-availability policies with the goal of ensuring that those who wish to 
12. Open Letter from Daniel Kahneman, NATURE (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.nature.com/
polopoly_fs/7.6716.1349271308!/suppinfoFile/Kahneman%20Letter.pdf (suggesting that 
social psychologists who run experiments set up a “daisy chain” of replications). 
13. MANY LAB, HTTPS://OSF.IO/89VQH/ (last visited July 26, 2016).
14. Id. Ten of the results were successfully replicated.
15. Richard A. Klein et al., Investigating Variation in Replicability: A “Many Labs” Replication Project, OPEN 
SCI. FRAMEWORK, https://osf.io/wx7ck/ (last visited July 30, 2016).
16. Mission and Objectives, BERKELEY INITIATIVE FOR TRANSPARENCY SOC. SCI., http://www.bitss.
org/about/ (last visited July 30, 2016).
17. Amy Novotney, Reproducing Results, 45 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 32 (2014), http://www.apa.
org/monitor/2014/09/results.aspx. See also, Replication in Economics, REPLICATIONWIKI,  http://
replication.uni-goettingen.de/wiki/index.php/Main_Page (last visited July 30, 2016). 
18. COS Mission, CTR. FOR OPEN SCI., https://cos.io/about_mission/ (last visited July 30, 2016).
19. About DART, DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.dartstatement.org/#!about/
c24vq (last visited July 30, 2016). 
20. The Journal Editors’ Transparency Statement (JETS), DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://
www.dartstatement.org/#!blank/c22sl (last visited July 30, 2016). 
21. POL. SCI. REPLICATION INITIATIVE, HTTP://PROJECTS.IQ.HARVARD.EDU/PSREPLICATION/HOME 
(last visited July 30, 2016). 
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attempt replication of published results have the necessary information.22 
Researchers from the U.K. and New Zealand have formed the Replication 
Network, a website designed to “serve[ ] as a channel of communication 
to (i) update scholars about the state of replications in economics, and (ii) 
establish a network for the sharing of information and ideas.”23 Economists 
have off ered ideas on how to create demand for replication.24 Others have 
nudged us toward methods that physicists have adopted to avoid bias caused 
by “the desire to support one’s theory, to refute one’s competitors, to be fi rst 
to report a phenomenon, or simply to avoid publishing ‘odd’ results.”25 The 
Allied Social Science Association held a workshop on replication in economics 
during its 2016 annual meeting.26 Researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank are 
calling for the creation of a journal dedicated solely to replication.27 The newly 
formed Critical Finance Review recently announced its plan to publish issues 
“dedicated to replicating the most infl uential empirical papers in fi nancial 
economics.”28
While empirical legal studies published in student-edited law reviews are 
experiencing the same problems currently plaguing the social sciences, they 
22. Sven Vlaeminck, Research Data Management in Economic Journals, OPEN ECON., http://
openeconomics.net/resources/data-policies-of-economic-journals/ [https://perma.cc/
FXG7-X8TT] (last visited July 26, 2016) (reporting that 21% of a sample of 141 high-ranking 
economics journals had a data availability policy in place). A recent study reports, however, 
that very few of the journals with such policies consistently enforce them. Sven Vlaeminck 
& Lisa-Kristin Herrmann, Data Policies and Data Archives: A New Paradigm for Academic Publishing 
in Economic Sciences?, in NEW AVENUES FOR ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING IN THE AGE OF INFINITE 
COLLECTIONS AND CITIZEN SCIENCE: SCALE, OPENNESS AND TRUST 145 (Birgit Schmidt & 
Milena Dobreva eds., 2015). Seventy-six percent of journals from a sample of economics 
journals (n = 346) with data availability policies (n = 71) require authors to submit data and 
procedures with the initial submission or before publication. Id. Twenty percent with data 
availability policies failed to make available the required information for any article in four 
issues investigated. Id. Only one journal with a policy made available data and procedures 
for every article in four issues. Id. 
23. REPLICATION NETWORK, HTTPS://REPLICATIONNETWORK.COM/ (last visited July 26, 2016).
24. See John Cochrane, Secret Data, THE GRUMPY ECONOMIST (Dec. 28, 2015), http://
johnhcochrane.blogspot.com/2015/12/secret-data.html (suggesting ways to create demand 
for replication including refusing to referee a paper if the author does not provide the data 
and procedures used to produce results, refusing to cite to articles if the data and procedures 
are not accessible, disclosing in tenure letters whether the candidate makes all data and 
procedures available, refusing to discuss conference papers unless the data and procedures 
are accessible, and refusing to invite to conferences those who do not disclose their data and 
procedures). 
25. Robert MacCoun & Saul Perlmutter, Blind Analysis: Hide Results to Seek the Truth, 526 NATURE 
187, 187-88 (2015). 
26. Replication and Transparency in Economic Research, INST. FOR NEW ECON. THINKING, http://
ineteconomics.org/community/events/replication-and-transparency-in-economic-research 
(last visited July 26, 2016).
27. Christian Zimmermann, On the Need for a Replication Journal (Fed. Res. Bank of St. Louis, 
Working Paper, No. 2015-016-A, 2015), http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2015/2015-016.pdf. 
28. RFP, CRITICAL FIN. REV., http://cfr.ivo-welch.info/RFP.html (last updated Jan. 2016). 
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are grappling with much more basic problems, most of which likely are wrung 
out of studies published in peer-reviewed journals. Epstein and King list 
many of the problems caused by a lack of adherence to the standard rules of 
inference. 29 From my perspective, the problems are even more basic than their 
list suggests. Objective errors—errors that methodologists would uniformly 
agree are mistakes—seem common. A handful of examples include:
1. incorrectly defi ning statistical terms such as “p-value” and “statistical 
signifi cance”; 
2. misinterpreting regression results (e.g., interpreting results as support-
ing claims of causation when they support only claims of correlation; 
misinterpreting a null result as proof of no causal relationship);
3. incorrectly applying statistical tests (e.g., performing a simple t-test on 
samples not drawn from mutually exclusive populations or when the 
population variances of two mutually exclusive groups are known to be 
unequal); and 
4. failing to account for and verify assumptions necessary to produce valid 
results (e.g., the commonly employed ordinary least squares regression 
model assumes independent observations, linearity, the absence of ob-
servations that exert undue infl uence on the estimates, and normally 
distributed residuals, to name a few). 
Given the lack of controversy around whether these types of problems 
constitute errors, we might ask whether we should expend any eff ort to reduce 
the likelihood that studies plagued by these sorts of basic errors get published. 
It could be that readers easily detect such errors and place appropriately low 
weight on invalid results. Even if this is the case, problematic studies can slow 
down scientifi c progress by shifting time and attention away from forward 
momentum and toward error correction. 30 On the policy front, concern might 
be quelled by claims that policymakers don’t read anything published in law 
journals, let alone empirical work published in them.31 Others assert, however, 
that at least some legislators, judges and others who craft law and make 
policy do refer to law journal publications32 and that the articles infl uence (or 
at least justify) policy choices.33 A (likely very) noisy estimate of how often 
29. Epstein & King, supra note 5.
30. Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1912 (2005) (arguing that pre-
publication peer review is crucial because if low-quality work is published, disputes over 
methods must be played out in public). Others worry that “sensational sound bites” from 
problematic studies can become “political tools.” Elizabeth Chambliss, supra note 5, at 29.
31. See e.g., Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REV. 295 (2000).
32. See e.g., David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal Scholarship by the Federal Courts of 
Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1345 (2011).
33. See Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 2, 4-6 (“[R]esearch that off ers claims or makes inferences 
based on observations about the real world—on topics ranging from the imposition of the 
death penalty to the eff ect of court decisions on administrative agencies to the causes of fraud 
in the bankruptcy system to the use of various alternative dispute resolution mechanisms—
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courts mention empirical studies published in law reviews suggests that these 
studies get at least some play in litigation.34 Epstein and King note that “[t]he 
staying power of fl awed and discredited legal studies can be extraordinary.”35
While studies with basic fl aws certainly are not totally devoid of value,36 they 
potentially cause more harm than good. At a minimum, the fact that our 
publication system does not weed them out raises concerns about the general 
quality of empirical legal studies published in law reviews, which potentially 
distracts us from important fi ndings.
Proposed solutions with the most promise to increase the quality of 
empirical work in law reviews must account for the factors that allow poor 
quality studies to make it into and to slip through the editing process. The 
next section off ers specifi cs about drivers that lead to low quality publications.
‘can play an important role in public discourse . . . and can aff ect our political system’s 
handling’ of many issues.”) (citing Ronald J. Tabak, How Empirical Studies Can Aff ect Positively 
the Politics of the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1431, 1431 (1998). See also Tracey L. Meares, 
Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedures—And Three Answers, 2002 UNIV. 
ILL. L. REV.  851, 853-57 (discussing the fact that judges are not trained to evaluate the quality 
of empirical research and pointing to examples of checks on the system that might help, 
including training judges and relying on the adversarial nature of our adjudicatory process).
34. I searched all state and federal cases in Lexis Advance using the following query: empirical 
w/s (“lj.” or “l. rev.” or “l.rev.” or “j.l.” or “law review”), limiting the search to cases 
published from Jan. 1, 1970, to present (July 30, 2016). LEXIS ADVANCE RES., HTTPS://
ADVANCE.LEXIS.COM (last visited July 30, 2016). The Cases database includes both reported 
and unreported cases in federal and state jurisdictions. The search returned 1084 opinions 
split roughly evenly between federal court opinions (566) and state court opinions (518). A 
histogram of frequency by year reported by Lexis suggests that the number of citations has 
increased over time:
 
 Unfortunately, Lexis does not provide counts on the graph’s vertical axis. The search is 
both underinclusive and overinclusive. Some empirical studies published in law reviews do 
not include the word “empirical” in the title, and articles with the word “empirical” in the 
title are not necessarily empirical studies. Note also that mentions are not always citations 
to support a court’s claim. For example, they might refer to studies cited in briefs submitted 
to the court. The point of the back-of-the-envelope count is to provide some rough evidence 
for the claim that empirical studies published in law reviews do make their way into briefs 
and opinions.
35. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 17 n.42.
36. Faulty studies often raise interesting and important questions and can prompt others to 
employ sound methods to search for answers. See Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, 
and Promise of Empirical Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1721-22, 
1730-31. 
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Potential Causes
How do basic errors survive the law review publication process? Both the 
authors of the studies and journals’ editorial boards play a role. On the author 
side, lack of training, inadequate training and incentives to publish empirical 
research drive low quality. First, some authors of low-quality studies have little 
methodological training, if any at all.37 Law reviews generally do not require 
authors of empirical studies to have any sort of empirical-methods training. 
To my knowledge, law review editors do not systematically assess authors’ 
credentials when selecting articles for publication.
Second, and potentially more harmful, many obtain insuffi  cient training. 
Law professors now have access to a number of short methods courses. The 
Center for Empirical Research in the Law at Washington University (St. 
Louis), for example, ran the fourteenth annual Conducting Empirical Legal 
Scholarship Workshop in June 2015.38 The workshop is designed for “law 
school faculty, political science faculty, and graduate students interested in 
learning about empirical research and how to evaluate empirical work.” 39 
The workshop promises to provide “the formal training necessary to design, 
conduct, and assess empirical studies, and to use statistical software . . . to 
analyze and manage data.”40 Topics include (but are not limited to) research 
design, data sampling methods, statistical inference, hypothesis testing, linear 
regression analysis, discrete choice modeling, graphic display of data, and 
how to use a popular statistical software package.41 The program is taught 
by two of the best methodologists in the fi eld of empirical legal studies.42 In 
theory, this sort of course might go a long way to increase the production 
of empirical legal scholarship. This course, however, and others like it are 
problematic in that they attempt to teach material generally covered over at 
least three semesterlong courses43 for law professors, some of whom likely 
have no background or knowledge of statistics,44 in just three days. Even if we 
37. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 9. 
38. My intent here is not to single out this program. It’s similar to a number of programs that 
law schools and other organizations run in an attempt to teach empirical methods to legal 
scholars. 
39. Conducting Empirical Legal Scholarship Workshop 2015, CTR. FOR EMPIRICAL RES. L., http://cerl.




43. The topics listed generally are covered in a course on statistics, a course on regression 
analysis and a course on discrete choice models, all semester-long courses.
44. “Participants need no background or knowledge of statistics to enroll in the workshop.” 
Scholarship Workshop, supra note 39. George Mason’s Law & Economics Center runs a similar 
training workshop that runs for fi ve days and requires no background in empirics. LEC 
Workshop on Empirical Methods for Law Professors, L. & ECON CTR., GEO. MASON U. SCH. L., 
http://masonlec.org/events/event/226-lec-workshop-empirical-methods-law-professors 
(last visited July 27, 2016). 
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assume that the average law professor can get up to speed with substantially 
less instruction than formally trained methodologists get, it certainly requires 
more than three days. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of these types of 
courses is that they provide basic training on how to use statistical software 
packages, allowing for the production of results that are often invalid but seem 
sophisticated to the untrained, student-editor eye.45 
45. The University of Michigan’s Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research 
(ICPSR) off ers a number of summer courses ranging in length from two days to four weeks. 
Summer Program in Quantitative Methods of Social Research, ICPSR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/sumprog/index.jsp (last visited July 27, 2016). Each course assumes diff erent levels 
of knowledge. For example, the four-day course on multivariate modeling with Stata and R 
assumes “only familiarity with introductory statistics.” Multivariate Modeling with Stata and R, 
ICSPR, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/sumprog/courses/0175 (last visited July 27, 
2016). The course packs quite a bit into four days: 
We begin with a review/crash course in the linear multiple regression model, and then 
move on to other important multivariate models including binomial logit and probit 
models, the multinomial logit model and the mixed logit model. The workshop then 
considers the interpretation of interaction eff ects in linear and nonlinear models as well 
as multilevel models that analyze how socio-economic and political contexts infl uence 
individual behavior. Time series and pooled time series methods that investigate how 
factors such as policy interventions and socio-economic conditions aff ect dynamic 
outcomes also are considered. Additional topics, such as the analysis of spatial 
statistical models will be covered, based on student interests and time availability. 
 Id. Four days likely are insuffi  cient to cover even one of these topics in the depth required to 
allow for the production of high-quality empirical work.
  Northwestern University off ers a fi ve-day workshop on causal inference designed for 
“[q]uantitative empirical researchers (faculty and graduate students) in social science . . . .” 
2016 Main Causal Inference Workshop, NW. SCH. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-
faculty/conferences/causalinference/frequentist/ (last visited July 27, 2016). Organizers 
assume 
knowledge, at the level of an upper-level college econometrics or similar course, of 
multivariate regression, including OLS, logit, and probit; basic probability and 
statistics including conditional and compound probabilities, confi dence intervals, 
t-statistics, and standard errors; and some understanding of instrumental variables. 
Despite its modest prerequisites, this course should be suitable for most researchers 
with PhD level training and for empirical legal scholars with reasonable but more 
limited training. 
 Id. Temporary statistical software licenses are provided; thus, it’s possible that those with 
the elusive “reasonable but more limited” training are able to learn just enough to use the 
software to produce results but not enough to produce valid results.
  Others have forwarded similar claims that use of sophisticated tools by unsophisticated 
researchers might reduce overall quality of empirical legal scholarship. See John F. Pfaff , 
A Plea for More Aggregation: The Looming Threat to Empirical Legal Scholarship 3-4 
(July 16, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1641435 (“The rise 
of the powerful desktop computer and user-friendly statistics software has been a mixed 
blessing for empirical work. On the one hand, the high-quality work, relying on large 
datasets and powerful statistical and computational techniques, has never been better. On 
the other hand, the low-quality work has likely never been worse, as a growing pool of 
unsophisticated researchers try their hands at empirical analysis. Overall average quality 
may even be declining.”).
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Third, the legal academy is encouraging the production of empirical legal 
studies by all who are willing to produce them.46 Some law schools have 
started to fund empirical legal scholarship.47 Law school libraries have created 
webpages devoted to empirical legal research.48 While these eff orts certainly 
increase the production of high-quality empirical work, they also lower the 
barriers to entry for those without suffi  cient credentials, who are more likely 
to produce low-quality work. Requirements for tenure often include positive 
reviews of scholarship by scholars writing in the same fi eld as the candidate, but 
law school tenure committees are not required to request reviews from internal 
and external colleagues with adequate methods training, and committees 
might have an incentive to bypass such reviewers to increase the likelihood 
of obtaining positive letters. Of course, once tenure is secured, incentives to 
produce high-quality empirical work are weakened by the ability to publish 
low-quality work in law reviews and the low probability that the published 
work will be challenged given the lack of incentives for empiricists to publicly 
criticize the methods of fl awed studies. 49 This developing infrastructure fosters 
the production of empirical legal research, but it does not guarantee quality at 
even the most basic levels.
The problems on the supply side are exacerbated on the demand side. Law 
students are the sole members of the vast majority of law journal editorial 
boards. They have complete discretion over which articles to publish and 
requirements for fi nal versions that appear in the pages of law reviews. Many 
in the academy have lamented the fact that law students are not qualifi ed to 
46. Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L. 
J. 141, 141-42 (2006) (“Empirical legal scholarship (ELS) is arguably the next big thing in 
legal intellectual thought. . . . ELS recently and dramatically has expanded in law reviews, 
at conferences, and among leading law faculties.”).
47. For example, see Shana Jackson, Library Tip: Empirical Legal Research Support, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 
9, 2015, 11:22 AM), http://library.law.yale.edu/news/library-tip-empirical-legal-research-
support (off ering support for Yale law students to perform empirical legal studies, which 
they sometimes use as job market papers on the entry-level law school job market). 
48. See, e.g., Empirical Legal Research, ROBERT CROWN L. LIBRARY, STAN. L. SCH., https://law.
stanford.edu/robert-crown-law-library/research-resources/empirical-legal-research/ (last 
visited July 27, 2016); Empirical Legal Research, LILLIAN GOLDMAN L. LIBRARY, YALE L. SCH., 
http://library.law.yale.edu/tags/empirical-legal-research (last visited July 27, 2016).
49. Exceptions exist. For example, the Stanford Law Review (in volume 57, issue 6, May 2005) 
published several critiques of Richard Sander’s empirical study of the impacts of affi  rmative 
action policies in law school admissions. See e.g., Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Does Affi  rmative 
Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (2005); David L. Chambers et 
al., The Real Impact of Eliminating Affi  rmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of 
Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855 (2005). In addition, Ian Ayres and John Donohue 
famously challenged the work of John Lott and David Mustard. See Ian Ayres & John J. 
Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193 (2003) 
(critiquing John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Carry Concealed 
Handguns, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1997)).
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select and edit legal studies, including empirical legal studies.50 Law review 
editors seem intrigued by empirical studies related to legal topics, despite the 
fact that they are diffi  cult to assess. For years, law reviews have been dominated 
by doctrinal and theoretical work. Empirical studies are relatively new to 
the scene, and their novelty and apparent usefulness make them especially 
appealing. Very few law students, however, are suffi  ciently trained in empirical 
methods to assess the quality of the work researchers submit. In many cases, 
the articles are published without any technical assessment. In some cases, 
law review editors request a review by a trained member of their law school’s 
faculty. Occasionally, law review editors will seek out a methodologist outside 
their home school’s faculty with knowledge of the study’s substantive fi eld. 
Peer review, though, is neither systematically sought nor required. Further, 
reputation eff ects are minimal at best. By the time published work is publicly 
criticized, the students responsible for publication have graduated. The rapid 
turnover of boards (once per year) makes it diffi  cult for boards to implement 
and sustain policies to improve quality. In short, law journal editorial boards 
do not have the necessary training to identify high-quality empirical research 
nor the appropriate incentives to ensure that only high-quality empirical work 
is published. This, in turn, creates an incentive for scholars to submit low-
quality empirical work that they believe might capture the attention of editors. 
And so it goes.
Many have recognized the quality problem and have off ered suggestions to 
address it, but few solutions have taken hold, and some might have worsened 
the problem. The next section catalogs some of the suggestions and argues 
that they have failed to generate incentives both for scholars to produce high-
quality work and for editors to publish only high-quality work. The section 
goes on to suggest ways to capitalize on the interests of scholars and editors 
to generate incentives for the production and publication of high-quality 
empirical legal studies. 
Generating Incentives for High Quality 
During the past couple decades, scholars have suggested ways to increase 
the quality of empirical scholarship published in law reviews. Epstein and 
King, for example, off er a set of suggestions, some of which are geared toward 
law student editors and others toward law school faculties.51 They suggest law 
schools off er courses in empirical research taught by trained methodologists 
and argue that law review editors be required to take a course with a focus on 
empirical research design.52 They recommend that law schools encourage law 
faculty interested in producing empirical research to develop the necessary 
methodological skills by taking methods courses, by attending short summer 
50. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 5 (reviewing complaints that have been published in the 
literature); Posner, supra note 4, at 1132-35. 
51. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 115. See also Lee Epstein & Gary King, Building an Infrastructure 
for Empirical Research in the Law, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (2003).
52. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 116.
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training programs, and by collaborating with trained methodologists.53 They 
advocate ways law schools can supply the resources necessary to support 
empirically minded faculty, such as providing necessary software and 
hardware, providing generous research assistance, off ering funding for data 
sets and other necessary ingredients, and providing the infrastructure required 
to obtain external funding. They advise adding faculty members to law review 
editorial boards, requiring at least one blind peer review of each empirical 
article by a reviewer who has some expertise in the methods employed and the 
substantive area of law addressed by the work, and requiring board approval 
of all empirical articles before publication. 54 They also push for law review 
editors to establish data archiving policies that allow for easy replication of 
published results.55 
Despite the myriad suggestions for ways to improve, little has changed in 
the way that law reviews select and edit empirical articles. Highly credentialed 
faculty are teaching empirical methods courses in a handful of law schools, 
53. Id. at 119-20. Others have suggested that the legal academy has already moved a long way in 
this direction by hiring researchers trained in both law and empirical methods, by fostering 
collaboration between law scholars and methodologists, and by funding research workshops 
that bring together researchers from diff erent disciplines. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, A Defense 
of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002). David Van Zandt recommends the 
Northwestern Law School approach of hiring dually trained faculty who are capable of 
producing high-quality empirical legal research, supporting new and existing faculty who 
wish to pursue graduate degrees, insisting on greater productivity and quality in tenure and 
promotions, and placing greater weight on peer-reviewed scholarship in scholarship reviews. 
David E. Van Zandt, Discipline-Based Faculty, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 332 (2003). 
54. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 127-28. See also Dauber, supra note 30, (echoing a call for peer 
review and citing to others who have done the same). Others are more pessimistic. Jack 
Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule warn that the peer-review process might stifl e innovation in 
scholarship. See Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 162 (2002) (“Peer review systems also raise the concern that senior 
scholars favor like-minded scholarship and choke off  the channels of intellectual change and 
development.”). Matthew Spitzer has voiced skepticism, predicting that authors facing peer 
review by both student-edited law reviews and peer-reviewed journals would opt to submit 
only to peer-reviewed journals to enjoy the benefi ts of working with professionals rather 
than students during the editing process. Matthew Spitzer, Evaluating Valuing Empiricism (at 
Law Schools), 53 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 328 (2003). This assumes, however, that a suffi  cient number 
of slots exist in peer-review journals to fi ll the demand for publication of empirical legal 
studies. In any event, Spitzer convincingly argues that moving to peer review would be 
costly in terms of the faculty time required, and that it would be politically diffi  cult to wrest 
full control from student editors.
55. Epstein & King, supra note 5, at 130-33. Epstein and King also encourage empiricists to make 
their data available and to advertise their availability on their CVs, and call for law schools 
to reward researchers for doing so. Gregory Mitchell elaborates on the benefi ts of a push for 
journals to require a set of disclosures, including information about the methods employed 
to produce results, data analysis procedures and raw data, suggesting that it might act as 
a primary way to improve the “scientifi c dialogue.” Mitchell, supra note 7. Michele Landis 
Dauber suggests that law reviews refuse to publish studies unless the author makes the data 
available for replication purposes. Dauber, supra note 30, at 1907-08. Matthew Spitzer agreed 
with the idea of documentation requirements and wrote that he planned to take the idea to 
a meeting of law school deans. See Spitzer, supra note 54.
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but no school to my knowledge requires journal editors to take any such 
course.56 Some dually trained scholars are publishing high-quality empirical 
studies in law reviews, but likely a larger number of insuffi  ciently trained law 
faculty are able to place low-quality work in the reviews. No editorial boards, 
to my knowledge, include faculty members, and only two journals mention a 
peer-review process in their submission instructions. 57 Some are reaching out 
to methodologists to ask for help reviewing submitted work, but most journals 
have no system in place to check quality. Finally, just a small handful of top 
journals currently require disclosure of data and/or procedures for replication 
purposes.58 If we have any hopes of eff ectuating change, we need to diagnose 
56. At least one law school (Cornell) off ers an optional course on empirical legal studies 
specifi cally designed for law review editors. E-mail from Dawn Chutkow, Visiting Prof. of 
Law & Exec. Ed. of Journal of Empirical Legal Scholarship, to author (May 19, 2015). The course 
was developed after student editors requested methods training. Id.
57. As of June 2016, websites for the main law reviews of law schools included in the top 
twenty of either the 2017 U.S. News & World Report law school ranking or Washington and 
Lee University’s law journal ranking using combined score and limited to student-edited 
journals included the following policies on peer review of submissions. See 2017 Best Law 
Schools, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/
best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools (last visited July 30, 2016); Law Journals: Submissions 
and Ranking, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited 
July 30, 2016). Stanford conducts peer review of each article submission. Article Submissions, 
STAN. L. REV., https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/submissions/issue-article/ (last visited 
July 30, 2016) [hereinafter Stanford Submissions]. Harvard subjects “many pieces” to faculty 
peer review. Submissions, HARV. L. REV., http://harvardlawreview.org/submissions/ (last 
visited July 30, 2016); Columbia “strongly prefers” to subject submissions to peer review, 
but whether that happens depends on selection time frames and other extenuating 
circumstances. Submissions Instructions, COLUM. L. REV., http://columbialawreview.org/
submissions-instructions/ (last visited July 30, 2016). University of Chicago “occasionally” 
conducts peer review. Submissions, U. CHI. L. REV., https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/
submissions (last visited July 30, 2016). Yale and NYU have an “extensive review process,” 
without mention of peer review. Volume 126 Submission Guidelines, YALE L.J., http://www.
yalelawjournal.org/fi les/V126SubmissionsGuidelines_fnm1a455.pdf (last visited July 30, 
2016) [hereinafter Yale Submissions]; Submissions, N.Y.U. L. REV., http://www.nyulawreview.org/
submissions  (last visited July 30, 2016) [hereinafter NYU Submissions]. The other top schools 
(Penn, UC Berkeley, Michigan, UVA, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas 
(Austin), Vanderbilt, Washington University (St. Louis), USC, Boston University, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame, and UCLA) make no mention of peer review in their 
online submission guide. 
58. As of July 2016, websites for the top twenty-four main law reviews (as defi ned in footnote 
57, supra) included the following policies: Yale recommends submission of the data. Yale 
Submissions, supra note 57. Stanford, NYU and Northwestern require publication of data 
on the journal’s website, with narrow exceptions (NYU and Northwestern do not require 
submission of the data until after the article is accepted). Stanford Submissions, supra note 57; NYU 
Submissions, supra note 57; Print Submissions, NW. L. REV., http://www.northwesternlawreview.
org/submissions (last visited July 30, 2016). UVA requires submission of data within seven 
days of accepting an off er to publish, encourages but does not require submission of data 
at the time of submission, and states a strong preference that the data be publicly available 
or disclosed upon request unless waived in extraordinary circumstances. Submissions, VA. L. 
REV., http://www.virginialawreview.org/submissions/articles-essays (last visited July 30, 
2016). Vanderbilt requires submission of procedures, methodology, or robustness checks 
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why law students and faculty have not been inspired to change the methods 
used to edit empirical studies in line with suggestions put forward over the 
past decade.
One possibility might be that past proposals do not suffi  ciently leverage the 
interests of the actors with power to eff ect change.59 Law students have little 
interest in ensuring high-quality publications given that they spend at most 
one year on the editorial board and their reputations do not depend directly 
on the quality of the work they print in the issues published during their 
short time at the helm. In the unlikely event that the quality of a published 
study is challenged, the students can point to the author of the study as the 
culpable party. This suggests that the authors of empirical studies might have 
an incentive to avoid reputation hits, but the pressure is not suffi  ciently strong. 
While some studies on hot-button issues like the impacts of gun laws on crime60 
and the eff ects of affi  rmative action programs in law school admissions on 
the success of black lawyers61 are challenged publicly following publication, 
researchers seem to have weak incentives, if any, to publicly criticize published 
studies that contain basic errors.62 Thus, both authors who submit low-quality 
empirical legal studies to law reviews and law review editors who select and 
edit articles lack strong incentives to increase the quality of published work.
How might we better capitalize on the interests of authors and editors? 
Both have an interest in protecting their reputations. The key is to put into 
place mechanisms that will generate direct reputational hits for authors who 
submit low-quality empirical studies and for editors who publish low-quality 
studies that are impossible to replicate. 
First, consider levers that might compel authors to take better care. Authors 
likely would focus more on quality if they expected reviews of their studies 
conducted by experts to be posted publicly. Certainly tenure-track law school 
faculty members would have a strong incentive to avoid reviews that publicly 
expose poor quality. Tenured faculty members’ incentives would not be as 
strong, but the reputation eff ects imposed by public reviews might be suffi  cient 
not included in the body of the article to be included as an appendix to the article and 
requests that the author prepare the data set to be sent upon request. Submissions, VAND. L. 
REV., https://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/about/submissions/ (last visited July 30, 2016). 
The other top schools (Harvard, Columbia, University of Chicago, Penn, UC Berkeley, 
Michigan, Duke, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas (Austin), Washington (St. Louis), USC, 
Boston University, Iowa, Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame and UCLA) have no posted 
data disclosure policy. 
59. Matthew Spitzer recognized this early on. He lamented that change likely is impossible 
from the inside due to lack of incentives for reform. Spitzer, supra note 54. 
60. See Ayres & Donohue, supra note 49.
61. See 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1745-2170 (2005) (issue 6, published in May 2005).
62. This claim is not based on any systematic empirical analysis. It is an assessment based on my 
own informal review of tables of contents of law journals, economics journals, and law and 
economics journals over the past decade.
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to compel at least some to take steps to avoid negative reviews, especially if 
they are widely publicized. 
How about incentives for student editors? Students might institute 
changes if their journals were graded on the quality of published empirical 
studies.  Currently, the Law Journal Rankings Project, hosted by Washington 
and Lee University’s School of Law, ranks law reviews annually based on a 
combination of impact and citation counts.63 Some journals tout their ranking 
on their websites.64 A Harvard Law School Library guide on deciding where 
to publish refers to Washington and Lee’s ranking.65 Rankings are discussed in 
popular online media outlets that cover law schools.66 Presumably law student 
editors care about their ranking, and they take steps to publish articles that 
will contribute maximally to the journal’s impact and citation scores. Student 
editors compete for articles submitted by heavily cited authors. Some evidence 
suggests students are motivated by journal prestige.67
Assuming these interests in fact motivate authors and students, we need 
an infrastructure that creates incentives based on these interests. Experts are 
needed to review published studies and journal policies and to compile and 
maintain a journal grading system.68 Academic societies are natural collectors 
of such experts. Further, they are well-positioned to take the lead in a serious 
and sustained eff ort to generate incentives for authors and editors. Society 
boards comprise, at least in part, expert empirical methodologists.69 These 
experts gain prestige through serving on the board, and the workload of 
63. Law Journals: Submissions and Ranking Explained, WASH. & LEE U. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://
lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/method.asp (last visited July 27, 2016). Eigenfactor.org also publishes 
a ranking of law-related journals using a method similar to the one Google uses to rank 
websites. About the Eigenfactor Project, EIGENFACTOR, http://52.6.43.8/about.php (last visited 
July 27, 2016); Journal Ranking for LAW, EIGENFACTOR, http://52.6.43.8/projects/journalRank/
rankings.php?search=OM&year=2014&searchby=isicat&orderby=Eigenfactor (last visited 
July 27, 2016).
64. The Google search “law journal rankings project” links to instances of such advertisements.
65. June Casey, Publishing in Law Reviews and Journals, HARV. L. SCH. LIBRARY, http://guides.
library.harvard.edu/c.php?g=309907&p=2070141 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015).
66. See, e.g., David Lat, America’s Next Top Law Review: New Rankings!, ABOVE THE L. (Feb. 24, 2014, 
4:30 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2014/02/americas-next-top-law-review-new-rankings/; 
Alicia Albertson, Best Law Reviews: Stanford Tops List, NAT’L JURIST (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.
nationaljurist.com/content/best-law-reviews-stanford-tops-list.
67. Jason P. Nance & Dylan J. Steinberg, The Law Review Article Selection Process: Results from a National 
Study, 71 ALB. L. REV. 565, 585 (2008).
68. A grading system seems preferable to a system that ranks journals. Under a grading system, 
each journal would earn a grade (e.g., excellent, good, fair, poor) that corresponds to a 
transparent set of requirements. 
69. The boards of the AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION (ALEA), HTTP://WWW.
AMLECON.ORG/ALEA-OFFICERS.HTML (last visited July 27, 2016) and the SOCIETY FOR EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUDIES (SELS), HTTP://WWW.LAWSCHOOL.CORNELL.EDU/SELS/ABOUT.CFM (last 
visited July 27, 2016), for example, always include several members with formal training in 
empirical methods who have published empirical studies in peer-reviewed journals. 
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nonoffi  cers is light.70 Serving as a board member likely would remain attractive 
if, during each year of service, members were required to review some number 
of empirical studies published in law reviews.71 To maintain continuity, the 
boards could create standing committees, the chairs of which could work 
together to coordinate and edit online publications of published article reviews 
and to determine and widely publicize annual journal grades.72 
Post-publication reviews would serve at least two purposes. First, they would 
act as a quality check on published work. Academics, law students, lawyers, 
judges, and other policymakers would have access to the entire set of reviews 
and the study author’s response to the reviews, if any.73 The reviews would 
assist readers who are unable to assess the quality of studies on their own. 
Second, the reviews would act as a teaching tool for both student editors and 
those aiming to sharpen their understanding of empirical methods, including 
authors of future studies. The reviews could be used to generate a catalog of the 
70. I have served as a nonoffi  cer on both the ALEA and SELS boards, and this has been my 
experience.
71. We might worry about the willingness of law professors to engage in this time-consuming 
process. The South Carolina Law Review experimented with peer review and reported that 
most law professors who were asked to review submissions were willing to complete timely 
reviews. See John P. Zimmer & Jason P. Luther, Peer Review as an Aid to Article Selection in Student-
Edited Legal Journals, 60 S.C. L. REV. 959, 969-972 (2009). In addition, most if not all methods 
experts are involved in the review systems of peer-reviewed journals. Peer review will not be 
new to them, although public posting of reviews will be.
  Even if a substantial number of volunteers step forward, we might worry about capacity 
given the number of empirical studies published in student-edited journals. To roughly 
estimate the number of empirical studies published by student-edited law journals, I 
searched Lexis Advance’s Law Reviews and Journals database using the terms “Table 1” and 
“statistical signifi cance” and publication (“law journal” or “law review”) for publication 
between Jan. 1, 2006 and Dec. 1, 2015. LEXIS ADVANCE RES., HTTPS://ADVANCE.LEXIS.COM 
(last visited July 30, 2016). Washington and Lee’s website allows the compilation of lists 
of student-edited journals and peer-edited or refereed journals. Law Journals: Submission and 
Ranking, 2008-2015, WASH. & LEE. SCH. L. L. LIBRARY, http://lawlib.wlu.edu/LJ/ (last visited 
July 27, 2016). A quick review of the lists suggests that student-edited journals are much 
more likely to contain “law review” or “law journal” in their title relative to peer-edited 
or referred journals. Lexis counts 678 articles published during the period 2006-2015, an 
average of sixty-eight articles per year (the distribution is roughly uniform across the years). 
LEXIS ADVANCE RES., supra. The same search over publication years 2011-2015 produces 379 
hits, an average of seventy-six articles per year. Id. To the extent reviewing only a portion 
of published articles is feasible, society committees could limit reviews to studies published 
in main journals, studies published in journals with the highest impact according to the 
Washington and Lee ranking, or a random selection of articles published in all student-
edited journals.
72. A grading system likely will be most eff ective the more widely publicized it is. Eff orts could 
be made to get annual grade reports into the hands of the law journal editorial boards, 
law school administrators, law school rank and tenure committees, judges, and other 
policymakers.
73. Authors would have an opportunity to issue a written response. The academic society 
committees would edit and publish the responses along with the reviews. While implementing 
a double-blind system would be impossible because the reviewer would know the author of 
the published study, reviewers could remain anonymous.
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most common errors that study authors might adopt as a checklist to reduce 
the likelihood of such errors in their own work. Eventually such a checklist 
might be used to generate a handbook that the committees could distribute to 
incoming editorial boards through the school’s expert faculty liaison.74
Once the post-publication review process gets underway, assigning grades 
to student-edited law journals would be fairly straightforward. Grades would 
be based on a combination of the quality of published empirical studies,75 the 
quality of any pre-publication peer-review process the journal employs, and 
the journal’s data and procedure disclosure policy and its implementation.76 
Grade assignment would be transparent, and the society committees would 
update them annually.77
If the grading system is perceived as legitimate, it could work to 
motivate student editorial boards to take better care in selecting and editing 
empirical studies.78 It might also justify intervention by faculty or law school 
administrators despite the strong norm of student editor independence. 
Empirical scholars might be compelled to submit articles only to the top-
ranked journals to bolster their reputations and to signal the quality of their 
work to those unable to independently assess quality.79 In addition, if authors 
believe that readers evaluate articles at least in part based on journal ranking, 
authors might lean toward submitting only to highly ranked journals to 
increase the potential impact of the study.
74. Such a handbook might also include guidance on construction of tables and fi gures and 
standards for database citation, publication, and access that track the guidelines promoted 
by Data Access & Research Transparency. See TOP (Transparency and Openness Promotion) 
Guidelines, DATA ACCESS & RES. TRANSPARENCY, http://www.dartstatement.org/#!2015-cos-
top-guidelines/kyeo4 (last visited July 30, 2016).
75. Reviewers could be asked to evaluate each study along some number of dimensions using 
Likert scales, and the scores could be used (carefully) to assess the overall quality of studies 
published by each journal. The reviewers could be directed to focus on objective measures 
of quality related to the sorts of basic issues noted supra, note 30 and accompanying text. If 
the idea of posting public critiques is disfavored, evaluations of published studies could be 
used solely in the determination of journal grades. The downsides are the lost opportunity 
to educate students and authors on the proper use of methods and the lost strong incentive 
for authors to ensure quality to avoid negative public evaluations.
76. The societies might off er journals advice on data and procedure disclosure policies and how 
to implement them, following the lead of organizations such as DA-RT.
77. The society committees might explore the possibility of incorporating the grades into 
Washington and Lee’s ranking system.
78. While transferring the functions of selection and editing from student editors to methods 
experts would be optimal, I’m pessimistic about law school administrators agreeing to go 
along with this sort of radical change. 
79. Michele Landis Dauber off ered a similar prediction related to a movement toward peer 
review. Dauber, supra note 30, at 1914 n.69 (“Status diff erentiation among law journals in 
favor of those which are peer reviewed would provide in law, as in other disciplines, a way 
to diff erentiate the quality of scholarship published in the fi eld by the locus of publication, 
thus conferring reputational benefi ts on scholars who chose to submit their work to the 
rigors of peer review.”).
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To the extent that public post-publication reviews compel student editors 
to seek pre-publication peer reviews, the academic society committees could 
help streamline the process. Given that authors simultaneously submit to 
potentially hundreds of law reviews, duplication of eff ort could be vastly 
reduced if student editors fi ltered requests for reviews through the society 
committees. Once a journal requests peer review of a submitted study, the 
committees would log it, and all student editors would have access to the peer 
reviews produced for the fi rst requester.80 If upon receipt of the peer reviews 
the editorial board decides to issue an off er for publication conditional on 
implementation of changes recommended by the reviews, the editors would 
have the option of submitting a revised version to the reviewers for approval. 
Editors might indicate in the publication that the article was peer-reviewed 
and approved.
It’s possible that students will resist the peer-review process given that it 
will substantially slow down the acceptance process. On a positive note, a few 
of the top main law journals now ask authors for exclusive submission for a 
period of time to allow a review.81 Even if journals decide not to slow down 
the process, all hope might not be lost if authors who wish to avoid critical 
post-publication reviews are motivated to submit only high-quality studies. 
Some might decide to limit themselves to producing only nonempirical 
studies. Others might decide to team up with a methods expert and jointly 
conduct empirical studies.82 The society committees might also implement a 
pre-submission peer-review process. Authors could submit completed drafts, 
and the society committees could facilitate a review and approval process 
similar to the process for journal editors.83 If reviewers decide the study is 
80. These reviews would not be posted publicly, and the committees might request that student 
editors keep them private and encourage the author to include mention of peer review in the 
study’s initial footnote. Societies might ask their relevant board members to agree to peer-
review some number of submissions each year and to submit them on a timely basis.
81. As of June 2016, websites for three of the top main law reviews (as described in footnote 57, 
supra) request that authors submit exclusively to that journal for at least a period of ten days. 
Harvard and Stanford “strongly recommend” authors submit exclusively to the respective 
journal for at least ten days, while Yale recommends submitting exclusively for at least two 
weeks. See Harvard Submissions, supra note 57; Stanford Submissions, supra note 57. None of the other 
top law reviews (Columbia, University of Chicago, NYU, Penn, UC Berkeley, Michigan, 
UVA, Duke, Northwestern, Cornell, Georgetown, Texas (Austin), Vanderbilt, Washington 
(St. Louis), USC, Boston University, Iowa, Minnesota, Fordham, Notre Dame, UCLA) 
discusses exclusivity in its online submission guides.
82. The society committees might consider implementing some sort of system that would help 
nonexperts fi nd experts with compatible subject interests and an interest in considering 
co-authorships.
83. The number of reviews the system can produce is, of course, limited by the number of 
volunteers willing to conduct reviews. If an insuffi  cient number of volunteers come forward, 
only some studies will get through the review process, and top student-edited law journals 
will compete for those studies. This might make it diffi  cult for other journals to improve 
their grades. These journals, however, will have options beyond publishing empirical studies 
of questionable quality. They can choose not to publish empirical studies. Alternatively, 
they might seek out alternative ways to obtain expert reviews such as requesting them 
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methodologically sound, the committees would post the approved draft on a 
webpage administered by the societies. The author could then point student 
editors to the webpage to verify that the societies approved the submitted 
draft, and the author could note this in the study’s initial footnote.84
The society committees also might off er ongoing assistance to student editors 
by recruiting at least one faculty member at each law school with expertise in 
empirical methods (if any) to serve as a liaison between the school’s editorial 
boards and the society committees. Those expert faculty members might meet 
with (or, at a minimum, communicate with) incoming board members to 
caution them on the diffi  culties inherent in assessing the quality of empirical 
submissions and provide editors with a list of potential peer reviewers broken 
down by substantive area and inform them of the services provided by the 
society committees.
Conclusion
In singing the praises of empirical legal scholarship Professors McAdams 
and Ulen write, “[E]mpirical and experimental methods have already 
contributed a great deal to legal scholarship, [and] . . . there is a good deal more 
that those methods could contribute to the scholarly understanding of the law. 
. . .”85 I wholeheartedly agree with this sentiment. They go on, however, to 
note that “the techniques necessary to become adept at these methods are not 
so daunting that legal scholars should be hesitant to make them a routine part 
of their toolkits.”86 This characterization of what’s required to conduct sound 
empirical work might have led us down a primrose path. While it is certainly 
not impossible for inexpert scholars to get up to speed, a short summer course 
might do more harm than good. Unfortunately, these courses provide training 
that allows for the production of results using empirical models that are 
diffi  cult to master in just a handful of days.
The current crises plaguing psychology, economics and other scientifi c fi elds 
certainly illustrate that peer review is insuffi  cient to guarantee high quality. 
The fi eld of empirical legal studies, however, is facing much more basic quality 
issues. We should consider joining other scientifi c fi elds in eff orts to increase 
the quality of published work, for the sake of the scientifi c endeavor and the 
from capable members of their faculties or from capable members of their schools’ other 
departments. 
84. Another option is to use a badge system similar to one the Association for Psychological 
Science adopted in 2014. See Open Practices, ASS’N FOR PSYCHOL. SCI., http://www.
psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/journals/psychological_science/badges 
(last visited July 27, 2016). Journals could award badges to studies approved after peer 
review. The society committees might consider working with the editors of The Bluebook 
to recommend or require a more general badge system to recognize compliance with best 
practices, such as peer review, data and procedure disclosure, and publication of data to an 
existing repository such as The Dataverse Project. 
85. Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 792.
86. Id.
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promise of better policymaking. Although many past suggestions have either 
fallen fl at or potentially exacerbated the problem, reforms that appeal to the 
interests of editors and authors (and, one hopes, the experts) might motivate 
reform.
The suggestions included here are merely that—ideas about how we might 
capitalize on the interests of involved actors to generate incentives for change. 
Myriad methods for tapping into relevant actors’ interests exist. The main 
point of this essay is that passive suggestions haven’t worked and likely won’t 
work to eff ect change. We need something more. Implementation of some 
or all of the suggestions on a grand scale might be impossible, at least at the 
start. The hope is that the basic framework acts as a starting point for getting 
some institutional changes underway. What is certain, however, is that change 
will require sustained eff ort by experts. This essay is a call to empirical legal 
scholars and to academic societies to work together to heighten the standards 
of published empirical scholarship and to join the ranks in other fi elds who are 
working toward the same goal.
